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Abstract: Social class, with its potentially pivotal influence on both policy-making and electoral 
outcomes tied to the welfare state, is a frequent fixture in academic and political discussions about 
social policy. Yet these discussions presuppose that class identity is in fact tied up with distinct attitudes 
toward the welfare state. Using original data from ten surveys fielded in the United States and Western 
Europe, we investigate the relationship between class and general stances toward the welfare state as a 
whole, with the goal of determining whether class affects how individuals understand and relate to the 
welfare state. Our findings suggest that although class markers are tied to objective and subjective 
positional considerations about one’s place in the society, they nevertheless do not seem to shape 
stances toward the welfare state. What is more, this is equally true across the various welfare state types, 
as we find no evidence that so-called “middle-class welfare states” engender more positive middle-class 
attitudes than other regimes. Based on our analysis, we propose that researchers would do better to 
focus on household income rather than class; while income may not be a perfect predictor of attitudes 
toward the welfare state, it does markedly better than class. 
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In the welfare state literature, social class features prominently. The working class is, in some accounts, 
viewed as a primary motor of welfare state expansion, while some instead zero-in on the middle class as 
the main class of interest when understanding welfare state politics (e.g. Stephens 1979; Korpi 1989; 
Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Iversen and Soskice 
2006). Other scholars have argued that class (no longer) plays any role, presumably because welfare 
states have created a convergence of preferences within the citizenry. In this scenario, welfare state 
politics will often be driven by the re-election concerns of political elites rather than the preferences of 
different social classes (Pierson 1994; 1996).  
 In our view, the first question to ask when considering social class and welfare state politics is 
whether people belonging to various classes actually hold distinct opinions about the welfare state. 
More precisely, we want to know if citizens’ class markers are politically relevant. That is, do citizens 
self-ascribing to, say, the “middle class” hold different opinions about the welfare state than citizens 
self-ascribing to other class groupings? What is more, we would like to know if the correlation between 
self-ascribed class and opinions varies across countries. Class consciousness may differ from one 
country to the next for a number of reasons, such as the historical strength of the labour movement or 
the organization of the welfare state, potentially making self-ascribed class status more important for 
opinions in some places.   
 Past research has been limited in its ability to explore these issues since no existing international 
survey has, to our knowledge, combined different measures of self-ascribed class with questions 
assessing respondents’ general relationship to the welfare state. Instead, existing surveys have tended to 
look at more specific attitudes toward the welfare state, relating to questions around social expenditure, 
redistribution, social programmes, or government responsibility toward in-need groups. While valuable, 
these sorts of questions do not allow us to understand how individuals understand and relate to the 
welfare state as a whole – an important exception given assumptions about the relevance of social class 
in certain strands of the welfare state literature.  
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To address this limitation, we fielded a 10-country survey with nationally representative samples 
and a total of more than 12 000 respondents. Through an analysis of these data, we reach somewhat 
sobering conclusions for the welfare state literature: self-ascribed class is a surprisingly poor predictor 
of general attitudes toward the welfare state, both at the national-level and across welfare state types. 
Our findings suggest that class identities are not tied up with stances toward the welfare state in the 
manner implied by much of the existing research, and that researchers would do better to focus on 
household income instead – though even it is not a perfect measure of welfare state preferences. We 
end by outlining potential explanations for these findings and highlighting wider implications for 
research on the contemporary welfare state. 
 
Setting the stage 
Welfare state scholars are divided on the importance of social class for social policy developments. For 
some researchers, social class – and in particular the working class – is essential to understanding how 
the welfare state emerged and persists (e.g. Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1989; Svallfors, 2004). The most 
prominent such example comes from research based on the power resource theory, which argues that 
generous welfare states normally emerged when a coalition was formed between the working class, on 
the one hand, and the middle class, on the other. Such coalition formation could happen either between 
the parties representing these classes in parliament, as in Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi 
and Palme, 1998), or within parties, as happened in many Continental European countries (van 
Kersbergen, 1995; van Kersbergen and Manow, 2009). And while the end of the twentieth century may 
have been marked by a decline in class consciousness, rather than suggesting that the concept now 
lacks importance, research in this vein instead highlights a shift in the balance of class power (see 
Taylor-Gooby, 1997). 
Other authors see (objective) income levels, not (subjective) social class membership, as the 
essential driver underlying welfare state preferences. The median-voter model of Meltzer and Richard 
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(1981) has inspired much work in this tradition. While this literature is theoretically focused on the 
median voter, it most often concentrates on the importance of the middle-income group instead. The 
common denominator of this research is that, due to the vote-seeking behaviour of political elites, it is 
the middle-income group that ultimately sets policy – but disagreement exists about what the middle-
income group wants to achieve with this power. The traditional assumption of the Meltzer-Richard 
model – that its preference is to increase redistribution until median and mean income is identical 
except for a small margin covering transaction costs – has been hotly debated (e.g., Kenworthy and 
McCall, 2008; Finseraas, 2009; Jæger, 2013; Schmidt-Catran, 2014; Sumino, 2014).  
If class membership was solely a matter of income, the distinction between these two strands of 
literature would be trivial; indeed, both approaches assume an antagonistic relationship between 
(vertically-demarcated) groups vying for redistribution and social programme access (see Rehm, 2016). 
In the real world, however, an individual’s objectively-defined place in the income distribution may be 
discordant with their subjectively-defined social class (cf. Savage et al., 2013). Such tensions may be 
particularly pronounced with a fuzzy concept like the “middle class”, where even academics disagree 
about the proper definition; indeed, given the general prominence of “middle class” self-identification 
in Western societies, it appears highly plausible that the meaning of social class markers differs 
dramatically for scholars and citizens. 
As a consequence, assumptions about the relationship between class and the welfare state may 
well be disconnected from the real-world significance of class identity. Such a reading is backed up by 
research criticising the political relevance of class distinctions on public opinion – often highlighting the 
importance of cross-class coalitions driven by overlapping insurance preferences (e.g. Oesch, 2006; 
Beramendi et al., 2015; Rehm, 2016). Building from earlier work by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), 
these authors suggest that (horizontal) occupational differences, not (vertical) class markers, are what 
really matter. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), for example, argue that work experiences are essential for 
opinion formation, and that class markers will have an impact only insofar as they reflect occupationally 
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homogenous groups; given the dramatic increase in the range of middle-class occupational groups over 
the last 50 years, this leads them to conclude that “the conventional notion of the ‘middle class’ is ill-
conceived and probably useless for many theoretical problems in political science” (1690). 
Indeed, scholars have highlighted a wide variety of factors that might shape citizen preferences 
vis-à-vis the welfare state. Analyses in this vein abound. An individual’s attitudes might, for example: be 
shaped by the ways in which social programmes do (or do not) offer benefits them personally (Pierson, 
1994; 1996); be driven by a desire to maximize a mix between insurance and redistribution – suggesting 
that insurance preferences, driven by variation in risk aversion, will be key (Moene and Wallerstein, 
2001; 2003; Rehm, 2011; 2016); and/or be affected by concerns about the relative distance from the 
middle-income group to the low- and high-income groups in society (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; 
Authors, forthcoming). Iversen and Soskice (2006), in turn, model when and how the middle-income 
group enters into parliamentary coalitions with either the low- or high-income group, providing an 
analytical framework that integrates the median voter and class coalition literatures.  
These debates have profound political implications. If individuals in different self-ascribed class 
groups do not hold distinct opinions, the political relevance of the concept diminishes considerably. 
Social group formation and mobilization require some form of distinction between groups (Tajfel, 
1974); as such, if class groups lack distinct opinions, it is less obvious that they can constitute a relevant 
political force vis-à-vis the welfare state. Real-world campaign practices provide mixed evidence on the 
matter. While direct appeals to the working class are increasingly rare, the middle class has featured 
prominently in contemporary political campaigning: in recent American elections, for instance, the 
“squeezed” or “disappearing” middle class has been wooed by both Republican and Democratic 
candidates. Yet the fact that candidates run campaigns to win middle-class votes might just as well 
signal that the concept is an empty vessel that candidates fill with their own rhetoric: that Republicans 
and Democrats can provide such radically different policy solutions to the problem of the disappearing 
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middle class (from draconic tax cuts to expanded government involvement), might suggest that this is 
indeed the case.  
We therefore set out investigate whether social class is a politically meaningful category, such 
that it is associated with distinct stances toward the welfare state. At the same time, we must also 
consider the extent to which this relationship varies across countries and welfare state types. While 
welfare states are most commonly thought to primarily derive the bulk of their support from the 
working class, many scholars have argued that encompassing, or universalist, welfare states tend to 
generate considerable support within the middle class (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998; Larsen, 
2008); this is both because the middle class stands to gain directly from universalist welfare programs 
and because the perceived distance between the middle class and the poor becomes smaller, militating 
against views of the poor as undeserving outsiders. If that is true, believing oneself to be middle class 
should have less of an impact on attitudes toward the welfare state in the Scandinavian universalist 
systems than elsewhere.  
 
Research design and data 
To investigate these questions, we fielded an original survey in ten countries, namely Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Overall, the survey was completed by 12 500 individuals, with at least 1200 respondents per country. 
After excluding respondents with missing data for any of our key variables and controls, we are left 
with 9059 data points in our main regression analysis, with the number of respondents per country 
ranging from 845 in Italy to 1007 in France. (Appendix Table 1 lists the number of respondents per 
country in both the sample as a whole and in the regression analysis carried out below.)  
All surveys were conducted by YouGov, a commercial polling company that constructs its 
samples via online panels. Respondents were quota-sampled to achieve representativeness on the basis 
of education, age, gender, and geographical region (defined by the European Union’s NUTS 2 region 
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classification scheme) – in other words, the standard set of variables with regard to which survey 
fielders typically aim to ensure representativeness. As a result of this process, YouGov survey data have 
been shown to exhibit essentially identical coefficient estimates and total survey error when compared 
to data collected via traditional mail and telephone surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014). Note 
also that YouGov provides corresponding design weights for each of the country samples, which we 
incorporate when constructing all figures and carrying out our analysis below (though we also confirm 
that weighting does not substantially alter any of the findings). 
Given our focus on welfare state attitudes, our choice of cases was based on a desire to examine 
countries across the range of Western welfare types (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996). This 
allows us to examine attitudes at both the country- and regime-level. In particular, Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden represent the Scandinavian universalist model; France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
represent the conservative model of Continental Europe; Italy and Spain represent the Southern 
European model; and the UK and the US represent the liberal, residual model typically found in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The basic intuition here is that different welfare state types likely engender very 
different class allegiances (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Rothstein, 1998; Larsen, 2008). They might, for 
example, provide a variety of benefits across the class spectrum (as in Scandinavia), concentrate 
generous benefits among the relatively better-off (as in Continental and Southern Europe), or target 
most benefits toward the poorest in society (as in the Anglo-Saxon countries). As a consequence, the 
impact of class on stances toward welfare state might differ considerably across the regime types.  
 The analysis below centres around two sets of questions: those meant to assess a respondent’s 
objective and self-perceived position in society; and those that address his or her attitude toward the 
welfare state. While the former set of questions allow us to explore the extent to which class identity 
reflects positional considerations, the latter questions assess the expected attitudinal consequences of 
those positions.         
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To assess objective and self-perceived positions in society, we rely primarily on a standard set of 
items (found also in general surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme). First and 
foremost, we ask respondents for their self-identified class status – our key independent variable – 
using the question:  
Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class. Which class you 
would say you belong to? 
 
1. Working class  
2. Lower middle class 
3. Middle class  
4. Upper middle class  
5. Upper class 
 
This set of class marker options has the benefit of disaggregating the middle-class into subgroups that 
reflect real-life practices.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the distribution of class identity across our various country 
samples. Crucially, we note that respondents do not simply all identify as “middle class”. Although a 
plurality of individuals in almost all countries place themselves within that category, a sizeable 
proportion of respondents identify otherwise: around 20 to 30 percent typically categorise themselves 
as working class (save for in the UK, where the working class, at 40 percent, is the largest group); while 
the size of the lower-middle class ranges widely from just over 10 percent in Denmark to over 30 
percent in Italy. The upper-middle class, in turn, is rather smaller, with proportions ranging from 3 
percent in the UK to 20 percent in Denmark. Given that less than 1 percent of respondents identified 
as upper class, we opt to exclude the category from our analysis below. 
We then consider this class placement data alongside responses to three additional sets of 
positional questions. In order to compare the effect of social class to that of objective economic 
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position, we use data on respondent’s household income, grouped into eleven income brackets. 
Because the variable is part of YouGov’s pre-collected background data, response rates are relatively 
high in comparison to standard surveys such at the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or 
the European Social Survey (ESS), though we still lose about one tenth of our sample.  
Given that class markers are clearly connected to much more than simple economic position, 
we also consider two questions intended to reveal respondents’ perceived position in society. The first 
of these asks respondents to place themselves on a decile spectrum, with the question:  
In our society there are groups that tend to be towards the top and groups which 
tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. 
Where would you put yourself on this scale? 
 
1. Bottom 
2. _ 
3. _ 
4. _ 
5. _ 
6. _ 
7. _ 
8. _ 
9. _ 
10. Top 
 
Note that the question wording here (taken from the ISSP) is purposefully broad, with the goal of 
having respondents reflect not simply upon their perceived economic position, but also their position 
in society more generally. The second question, in turn, is an original survey item designed to assess 
whether a respondent feels closer to those at the bottom or the top of society. To that end, 
respondents were presented with the statement “In general I have much more in common with poor 
people than with the rich” and then asked to record their agreement along a five-point scale (“Disagree 
strongly” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither agree nor disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), and “Agree strongly” (5)).  
Traditional measures of welfare state attitudes normally either ask respondents about 
preferences for government redistribution or whether government should spend more or less on 
certain social programs. Yet none of these standard items actually relate to the respondent’s own 
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relationship with and beliefs about the welfare state. Rather, they concern aggregated outcomes (i.e. 
redistribution) and specific social policies, and these may or may not be derived from attitudes about 
the welfare state as such. Put differently, correlating self-identified class position with preferences for 
redistribution and social spending will generate estimates that may be difficult to interpret when our 
interest is the welfare state per se. Indeed, this is particularly a problem as research mounts on the widely 
varying redistributive effect of social spending across different welfare states; in some, social spending 
is by and large directed at those with the lowest incomes, while the reverse is true in other places (e.g. 
Jensen and van Kersbergen, 2017: 97).  
For these reasons, our analysis is based on three novel survey items investigating beliefs about 
one’s general relationship to the welfare state, all of which employ the aforementioned set of responses 
ranging from “Disagree strongly” (1) to “Agree strongly” (5). The first of these questions is intended to 
determine whether respondents consider themselves to be net contributors to the state; we thus 
solicited their opinion on the statement “Overall, I pay more in taxes than I get back from state”. With 
a decidedly more neutral tone than our other key survey items, this question provides insight on how 
respondents perceive their fiscal relationship to the state. In much starker terms, the second survey 
item presents respondents with the hypothetical statement “I would ultimately be better off if the 
welfare state didn’t exist”; the goal here is to draw out particularly harsh critics of the welfare state – 
whether that criticism is driven by perceived class status or other considerations. Finally, we also asked 
respondents for their agreement with the statement “The welfare state creates more problems than it 
solves”. Once again, our intention is to assess respondents’ global assessments of the welfare state, in 
this instance by asking them to reflect on the balance between the asserted positive and negative 
consequences that are frequent fixtures in political debate. Further details on responses to these 
questions are laid out in Appendix Table 2, which presents the (weighted) means and standard 
deviations of each survey item across all of the countries in our sample. 
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Despite variation in their tone and focus, our three key survey items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.74 and are highly correlated, suggesting that each is capturing an element of what could be collapsed 
under a broad umbrella of “welfare state scepticism”. This does not, of course, suggest that the three 
questions provide an encompassing overview of citizens attitudes toward the welfare state; rather, each 
assesses a component of one’s general relationship to the welfare state, whether in terms of the 
individual’s personal gains and losses or the societal benefits and drawbacks of social programmes. If 
welfare states cater differently to different classes across our 10 countries (and assuming people both 
notice and care), this should come out directly when we study the correlation between self-identified 
class position and these welfare state attitudes.  
 In examining the relationship between responses to the questions and self-identified class, we 
employ the standard set of baseline controls (see, for example, Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Finseraas, 
2009; Rehm, 2011), namely: a binary gender variable (with males coded as 1), reflecting research that 
suggests women are generally expected to more supportive of the welfare state (e.g. Svallfors, 1997); 
age, as well as its squared value (to allow for non-linear effects); education, with respondents sorted 
into one of three categories (coded 1 for those with less than secondary education, 2 for those having 
completed secondary education, and 3 for those with a post-secondary degree or diploma); trade union 
membership, as members are typically more supportive of the welfare state (e.g. Cusack et al., 2006); a 
binary religious attendance variable (coded 1 for those who have attended a religious ceremony 
(excluding special occasions) over the past month), since religiosity may shape welfare attitudes (e.g. 
Scheve and Stasavage, 2006); employment status dummy variables for the unemployed and the retired; 
and a binary variable denoting if a respondent’s main source of income is government benefits. In 
constructing our analysis using a standard set of baseline controls, our intention is to set up the simplest 
test for class membership, as we avoid potentially crowding out the effect of the variable. We 
nevertheless confirm that our findings remain robust if we also include measures such as home 
ownership (see Ansell, 2014) and left-right ideological self-placement. Appendix Table 3 provides an 
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overview of the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of all variables used in 
this paper. 
 
Analysis 
Our investigation proceeds in two stages. Before turning to analyse attitudes toward the welfare state, 
we first establish that self-identified class status is not entirely disconnected from related social and 
economic considerations in the minds of respondents; in other words, we want to know whether class 
status has meaning that is connected to the sorts of considerations that should be connected to the 
welfare state attitudes we examine. Doing so also helps validate our newly collected survey data by 
documenting that our findings regarding welfare attitudes (to be reported in the second step of the 
analysis) are not simply a by-product of anomalous data.  
To that end, Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of a given class that falls into each of the income 
brackets (in the top panel) and self-perceived deciles (in the bottom panel) across the sample as a 
whole. Looking first at the relationship between class and household income brackets, we note that 
although there are always at least a few individuals from every income category within each of the 
classes, the pattern broadly reflects a general link between class and income: as one moves from the 
working class across the class spectrum to the upper-middle class, we find a growing percentage of 
individuals in the higher income brackets. That said, the difference between the working class and the 
lower-middle class is negligible, and members of the upper-middle class in particular are spread widely 
across the income range.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
   
 Looking beyond objective economic position, the bottom panel of Figure 2 turns our attention 
to the respondents’ self-perceived positions in their societies. Here we find a much closer relationship 
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with class identity, even when we compare the distribution of answers for working and lower-middle 
class respondents. The modal response increases as we move across the class spectrum – from the 
working class (at the 3rd decile) to the lower-middle (5th), middle (6th), and upper-middle (7th) class 
groups – and (weighted) mean responses increase steadily (at 3.7, 4.2, 5.6, and 6.8 respectively). While 
respondents from each class grouping do not of course cluster into a single perceived decile, most can 
nevertheless be found spread across two to three adjacent decile groups.   
 Finally, examining perceived proximity to the poor versus the rich offers another way to assess 
whether class identification is tied to one’s (perceived) position in society. Yet since a variety of 
individual-level characteristics may shape responses to this question (as well as those below), the 
remainder of the paper will present results from multivariate analysis. In particular, logistic regressions 
(incorporating design weights) were run (1) independently for each country in the sample, (2) pooling 
together countries based on their welfare state type, and (3) on the sample as a whole. In the latter two 
instances, the analysis also includes country dummies to control for country-level heterogeneity. In each 
iteration of the analysis, we seek to explain agreement with a given statement (with agree and strongly 
agree coded as 1), controlling for the various factors laid out in the previous section. The result is a set 
of 15 regressions per question. All findings are therefore illustrated via plots of marginal effect sizes,1 
with full regression tables relegated to an Online Appendix.  
           
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 Figure 3 presents the first variant of this analysis, regarding agreement with the statement “In 
general I have much more in common with poor people than with the rich”. The figure illustrates the 
marginal effect (on probability of agreement) of a given class status relative to the working class. The 
                                                             
1 Results presented using the coefplot package (Jann 2014), tabplot (Cox 1998), and plotplainblind (Bischof 
forthcoming). 
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size of the marginal effects is reported on the horizontal axis and with 95% confidence intervals 
displayed as the bars around each marginal effect estimate. In this setup, if the 95% confidence 
intervals overlap with the vertical zero line, the effect is statistically insignificant. Results confirm the 
connection between self-ascribed class and societal position: the probability of agreeing with the 
statement decreases progressively (relative to working class respondents) as one moves up the class 
hierarchy, with relatively large marginal effect sizes. Indeed, despite a few exceptions in Scandinavia and 
France vis-à-vis the lower-middle class, this relationship is consistent across countries, welfare-state 
regimes, and the sample as a whole.2  
 All in all, there is little doubt that people are on average perfectly capable of situating 
themselves in the class hierarchy. Those with lower incomes and a perception that they have more in 
common with the poor tend to self-identify as a lower class than those with a higher income and less in 
common with the poor. These findings corroborate other studies using measures such as occupation 
(e.g. Curtis, 2016), and lead us to confirm that class clearly has a social and economic meaning for our 
respondents. The core question of our paper remains, however: do these self-identified class positions 
also reflect distinct stances toward the welfare state?  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Our first attempt to respond to this question is laid out in Figure 4, which is focused on 
agreement with the statement “Overall, I pay more in taxes than I get back from state” We thus begin 
by examining what factors shape an individual’s self-identification as a net contributor or net recipient. 
Here the presentation replicates that found in Figure 3 – illustrating the effect of a given class marker 
                                                             
2 Note also that the differences between the middle and upper-middle class are statistically significant everywhere 
except Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
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relative to the working class – but we also add an additional panel (on the right) demonstrating the 
effect of moving up one income bracket. (Recall that there are 11 brackets in total.) 
If social position matters, responses to this statement would be the most obvious place to find 
it out of our three key dependent variables. Yet as Figure 4 makes clear, there is little evidence (outside 
of the French case) to suggest that social class affects agreement with this statement. Nor is this 
because of a lack of variation: the split among respondents on this question is more or less even, with a 
small majority (58 percent) asserting that they are net contributors. Indeed, as the right-most panel in 
the figure demonstrates, household income does a much better job of explaining responses to these 
questions: while a few individual countries do not quite reach statistical significance, only Spanish 
respondents clearly diverge from the general trend; and income reaches significance for the welfare 
state types as well as the overall sample. Taking the sample as a whole, moving across the interquartile 
range of income categories (from the third to the ninth bracket) entails an increased likelihood of 
agreeing of just over 15 percent. In France – the only country for which there was consistent evidence 
of a class effect – the impact of moving from the working class to the upper-middle class (at 18 
percent) is surpassed even by an increase of three income brackets (at 21 percent). 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 Figure 5, in turn, repeats the above exercise, but focuses on agreement with the claim “I would 
ultimately be better off if the welfare state didn’t exist”. This statement presumably captures the 
respondents’ overall assessment of the welfare state. Assuming an even modestly redistributive welfare 
state – and given the results above which link class to position in the societal hierarchy – one might 
expect class to be a major determinant of responses; yet, as the figure indicates, results are noteworthy 
in that there is strikingly little evidence of an effect of class status on responses to the statement. The 
effect sizes of the various class markers are almost never statistically significant, and in the few 
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instances that they are, they remain small and sensitive to small changes to model specification. Recall 
also that the list of controls employed is relatively limited – adding a control for ideology, for example, 
erases even the small effect that is at times present in the Anglo-Saxon welfare states.  
In a certain sense, given that a focus on insurance preferences would suggest broad agreement 
with the idea that one is better off with a welfare state than without one, these non-findings are perhaps 
not as shocking as one might initially think. Yet as the figure also illustrates, there is evidence that 
income matters – though the effect here varies greatly by welfare state type. In the Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental welfare states (save for the Netherlands), higher income is consistently associated with a 
greater probability of agreeing that one would be better off if the welfare state did not exist. In the 
Scandinavian and Southern European welfare states, by contrast, we find no evidence of such an effect. 
While in the case of Scandinavia this divergence may be explained by the broader popular base of 
universalist welfare states, it is interesting to note that the Southern European welfare states do not fall 
in line with their corporatist Continental neighbours. Whether this distinction reflects temporary factors 
(such as the impact of recent economic crises) or more long-term ones (such as the increased focus on 
benefits for welfare state insiders) would however require further research. 
  
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
 Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the marginal effect of class status on agreement with the statement 
“The welfare state creates more problems than it solves,” reflecting potential concerns about the 
welfare state’s negative externalities. Here once more, one would predict, a priori, that responses would 
be closely related to class identification, albeit perhaps with different gradient across welfare state types 
– but results again belie expectations. Evidence of a relationship between class and agreement is scarce. 
What is more, in the few instances in which small statistically significant effects are present, they are 
often in the opposite direction than one would expect: for example, upper-middle class respondents 
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seem, in the sample as a whole, to be marginally less likely than working class respondents to think that 
welfare creates more problems than it solves. Yet these results are not robust to changes to the 
included sample (i.e. remove-one jackknifing) nor, often, to the introduction of additional common 
control variables. Indeed, even income does not help us to understand responses to this question: the 
only evidence of an effect here is found in the Anglo-Saxon welfare states, and is entirely driven by the 
United States.   
 Overall, then, we find that while class self-identification does appear to be tied to one’s actual 
and perceived position in society, it is nevertheless an extremely poor predictor of attitudes toward the 
welfare state. This is an especially striking finding given that several of our survey questions are 
expressly focused on welfare state attitudes that should (in theory at least) be driven by positional 
considerations – namely, believing oneself to be a net contributor to the welfare state, and feeling that 
one would be better off if the welfare state did not exist. The broad lack of evidence of a class-based 
effect suggests that although class may have social and economic meaning for individuals, we should 
not take for granted that it will have corresponding political meanings as well.  
 
Conclusion 
Class actors often play an important role in accounts of the origin and persistence of welfare states, 
particularly in work connected to the Power Resource Theory (e.g. Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1989). Yet 
do social classes constitute distinct groups in terms of attitudes toward the welfare state? Based on a 
unique survey covering more than 12 000 respondents in 10 countries, our answer is a resounding 
“no”. Indeed, none of the class groups we explored here really stood out in terms of their stances 
toward the welfare state. Self-identified working-class respondents were just as likely to think negatively 
about the welfare state as self-identified middle or even upper-middle class individuals. There is, by 
contrast, more evidence to suggest that income level matters for attitudes toward the welfare state; but 
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even its impact varies considerably, depending on both the question asked of respondents and the 
country in which they live.    
Our findings thus align with previous research suggesting that class markers (e.g. Oesch, 2006; 
Beramendi et al., 2015) and in some instances even income groups (Soroka and Wlezien, 2008) may be 
less relevant than often assumed in the literature. Yet, crucially, self-identified class position is 
nonetheless tied to individual-level characteristics that should presumably shape one’s general stance 
toward the welfare state: it correlates strongly with income and affinity with the poor. Self-identified 
class positions, in other words, clearly have a social and economic meaning – they just lack any 
corresponding effect on attitudes towards the welfare state. 
 Why might this be the case? While this is an obvious avenue for future research, two potential 
answers seem obvious. On the one hand, the simplest answer is that class positions simply never 
mattered that much for attitudes toward the welfare state, and that other individual-level characteristics 
– such as risk aversion and occupation – are what really matter (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; 
Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014). Similarly, it could also be that while social class was important during the 
expansionary phase of the welfare state (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1989), its relevance may have 
diminished considerably since the 1970s (e.g. Pierson, 1994; 1996). Insofar as governments seek to 
reform the welfare state while avoiding electoral backlash, the relevant societal groups should be either 
benefit recipients for whom losses will be concentrated (e.g. retirees with pension reform) or citizens 
clustered around the median income group.  
For related reasons, part of the explanation for our findings may lie with parties rather than 
individuals: in a study of the United Kingdom, Evans and Tilley (2017) suggest that the decline of class 
voting can be best explained not by a breakdown of class, but rather by party de-alignment – with 
parties moving towards the centre in a hunt for the fabled middle-class voters. From this perspective, 
people may be just as likely as ever to feel a sense of class belonging, but parties no longer represent 
classes very well. Indeed, research suggests the popularity of the welfare state has pushed centre-right 
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parties to give up many of their most fiscally conservative positions, not least on areas such as health 
care and old age pensions (Jordan, 2011; Jensen, 2014). In a similar fashion, social democratic and other 
centre-left parties have adopted some of the policy positions previously associated with the right, 
including budget discipline and marketization of public services (Green-Pedersen, 2002; Klitgaard, 
2007; Gingrich, 2011). Welfare attitudes may therefore not correlate well with self-identified class 
position because the political system is less structured around these attitudes than in the past. Future 
research, in short, needs to pay close attention to the possibility that the policy preferences of classes 
and welfare state politics may well be endogenous to each other. As a consequence, research exploring 
how political parties understand class markers and their potential political relevance would be especially 
valuable. Is class really a relevant concept for office-seeking political elites, or are appeals to the middle 
class simply a (relatively content-free) holdover from a time when class actually mattered?  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1: Number of respondents per country. 
Country 
 
Number of Respondents Respondents in Regression 
Analysis 
Denmark 1206 953 
France 1201 1007 
Germany 1202 852 
Italy  1202 845 
Norway 1213 913 
Spain 1203 862 
Sweden 1214 940 
The Netherlands 1207 882 
The United Kingdom  1202 916 
The United States  1200 889 
Total 12 050 9059 
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables, by Country  
 
 
Net Contributor Better Off No Welfare Welfare Creates Problems 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Germany 3.566518 1.305878 2.317607 1.150341 2.643214 1.210682 
Denmark 3.051229 1.394146 1.778819 1.067746 2.311303 1.227686 
Spain 3.779737 1.270554 2.342309 1.243574 2.672928 1.259177 
France 3.709832 1.245927 3.391575 1.091899 3.551546 1.090288 
Italy 4.208566 1.083002 2.836499 1.322289 3.09242 1.286884 
Netherlands 3.782573 1.209654 2.65845 1.295533 3.228861 1.289139 
Norway 3.014337 1.402512 1.767052 1.079084 2.272171 1.259441 
Sweden 3.569216 1.428732 2.223657 1.25312 2.548195 1.304019 
UK 3.520029 1.372843 2.41381 1.283022 2.734617 1.310409 
US 3.592902 1.322949 3.046164 1.420304 3.36337 1.387334 
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Appendix Table 3: Weighted descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Social class 2.40 0.97 1 4 
More similar to poor  3.45 1.07 1 5 
Net contributor 3.58 1.35 1 5 
Better off without welfare 2.47 1.32 1 5 
Welfare creates problems 2.83 1.33 1 5 
Male (binary) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age 47.99 16.12 18 90 
Education 2.11 0.74 1 3 
Trade union membership 1.28 0.45 1 2 
Religious attendance (binary) 1.27 0.44 1 2 
Unemployed (binary) 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Retired (binary) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Main income from benefits (binary) 1.21 0.41 1 2 
Income category 4.85 2.75 1 11 
Perceived decile 4.99 1.80 1 10 
Ideological self-placement 5.22 2.58 0 10 
Home owner (binary) 0.55 0.50 0 1 
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